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Abstract Proponents of evidence-based medicine and some philosophers of sci-
ence seem to agree that knowledge of mechanisms can help solve the problem of
applying results of controlled studies to target populations (‘the problem of
extrapolation’). We describe the problem of extrapolation, characterize mecha-
nisms, and outline how mechanistic knowledge might be used to solve the problem.
Our main thesis is that there are four often overlooked problems with using
mechanistic knowledge to solve the problem of extrapolation. First, our under-
standing of mechanisms is often (and arguably, likely to remain) incomplete.
Secondly, knowledge of mechanisms is not always applicable outside the tightly
controlled laboratory conditions in which it is gained. Thirdly, mechanisms can
behave paradoxically. Fourthly, as Daniel Steel points out, using mechanistic
knowledge faces the problem of the ‘extrapolator’s circle’. At the same time, when
the problems with mechanistic knowledge have been addressed, such knowledge
can and should be used to mitigate (nothing can entirely solve) the problem of
extrapolation.
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Introduction
Philosophers of science have recently argued that studying mechanisms is useful for
addressing many conundrums in science and the philosophy of science. A paper that
sparked recent interest in mechanisms concluded: ‘if one does not think about
mechanisms, one cannot understand neurobiology and molecular biology’ [1, p. 24].
Investigating mechanisms also allegedly helps provide an account of causation [2–
4], scientific explanation [4, 5], and Glennan even argues that providing a
mechanism solves Hume’s problem of induction [2]. Philosophical work on
mechanisms has expanded into the social sciences [6] and medicine [7, 8]. Some
philosophers have argued that knowledge of mechanisms can help solve the
problem of applying average medical study results to target populations [9–15]. This
is alternatively referred to as the problem of ‘external validity’, ‘generalizability’,
and ‘extrapolation’. Following some work in the philosophical literature [10–13],
we use the term ‘problem of extrapolation’.
In this paper, we explore how knowledge of underlying mechanisms might solve
the problem of extrapolation. We shall argue that apart from a few cases, serious
obstacles prevent mechanisms from offering a robust tool to solve the problem. We
begin by describing the problem of extrapolation, defining mechanisms, and
outlining how knowledge of mechanisms offer a solution. We then describe four
often-overlooked problems with using mechanistic knowledge to solve the problem
of extrapolation. First, our knowledge of underlying mechanisms is often mistaken
or incomplete. Secondly, knowledge of mechanisms often cannot be justifiably
extrapolated outside the tightly controlled laboratory situations in which such
knowledge is usually produced. Thirdly, mechanisms can behave paradoxically.
Finally, using mechanistic knowledge does not overcome what Dan Steel calls ‘the
extrapolator’s circle’. It would be a mistake, however, to claim that knowledge of
mechanisms never helps mitigate the problem of extrapolation. We provide
examples of exceptional cases in which mechanistic knowledge is helpful. We
conclude that while mechanistic reasoning can be useful for solving the problem of
extrapolation in some cases, one may have to look elsewhere for more robust
solutions. Until such solutions are found, one may have to adopt a higher degree of
scepticism about the applicability of results from controlled studies to target
populations.
Why it is problematic to apply the results of controlled studies
to target populations
Average study results may not apply to individuals or subgroups within a study, or
to target populations which are sometimes relevantly different from study
populations. This problem is commonly discussed in the context of randomized
trials, but it also applies to controlled observational studies and, as we shall point
out below, results from studies that investigate underlying mechanisms. It is a
problem whether the studies are analysed using frequentist or Bayesian methods
[16].
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Consider the following imaginary example. If half the participants in a trial
experienced 100% recovery, and the other half experienced no effect, the average
outcome (50% recovery) would not describe what happened to any particular
individual in the study. In a real example taken from Peter Rothwell [17],
investigators conducting the European Carotid Surgery Trial (ECST) found that
carotid endarterectomy appeared to carry an obvious risk (an approximately 0.5%
increase in mortality) [18, 19]. However, when Rothwell restricted the analysis to
patients with severe carotid stenosis, the intervention was found to be beneficial
[17]. This is not a problem with implementing the study results to populations
outside the trial; hence, the term ‘external validity’ is misleading. Unless there is
no variation, average study results may not even apply to individuals within the
trial.
In addition, target populations can be different from study populations. Up to
90% of potentially eligible participants are sometimes excluded from trials
according to often poorly reported and even haphazard criteria [20–25]. For
example, even the most effective antidepressants in adults have doubtful effects in
children [26, 27]. In another example taken from John Worrall [28], the drug
benoxaprofen (OraflexTM in the USA and OprenTM in Europe) proved effective in
trials in 18–65 year-olds, but killed a significant number of elderly patients when it
was introduced into routine practice. The problem that average results do not apply
to individuals or subgroups within a trial is exacerbated by the fact that people can
change over time. Results from a study that were applicable at time T1 might not
apply at a different time T2.
Besides differences between people in study and target populations, study and
target contexts can differ. In a presidential address to the Philosophy of Science
Association [15], Nancy Cartwright illustrated this aspect of the problem with the
example of the Tamil Nadu Integrated Nutrition Programs (TINP I and TINP II). These
programs aimed to improve the nutritional status of preschool children (6–36 months
old) and pregnant and nursing women. To achieve the aim, investigators provided a
package of services that included nutrition education, primary health care, supple-
mentary on-site feeding of children, education for diarrhoea management, vitamin A,
deworming, supplementary feeding of women, and growth monitoring through
monthly weighing of all children aged 6–36 months.
TINP’s success was measured by comparing changes within TINP districts with
changes in non-TINP districts. Independent surveys showed that severe malnutrition
declined by at least 33% among children aged 6–24 months and by 50% among
those aged 6–60 months [29, 30]. TINP II was similarly successful, with a more
conservative independent estimate of a 44% decline in severe malnutrition over five
years [31, 32].
Inspired by TINP, a similar project called BINP (Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition
Project) was implemented in Bangladesh. Unfortunately, BINP enjoyed little
success: independent agencies reviewed the evidence and found little reason to
believe that the project had had any impact [33, 34]. While the relevant biological
traits of the study participants in Tamil Nadu and Bangladesh are unlikely to have
been very different, the social contexts in Bangladesh were dissimilar in important
ways. The first main difference appeared to be ‘leakage’: the food supplied by the
Problems with using mechanisms 277
123
project in Bangladesh was often used as substitutes for other family members rather
than supplements for mothers and children. Other related reasons were ‘the mother-
in-law factor’ and the ‘man shopper’ factor:
The program targeted the mothers of young children. But mothers are
frequently not the decision makers … with respect to the health and nutrition
of their children. For a start, women do not go to market in rural Bangladesh;
it is men who do the shopping. And for women in joint households—meaning
they live with their mother-in-law—as a sizeable minority do, then the
mother-in-law heads the women’s domain. [35, p. 6]
To recap, the problem of extrapolation is the problem of justifying claims that
average study results apply to ‘target populations’. For present purposes, we shall
take target populations to be populations other than average study populations. This
includes individuals or subgroups within a study, or populations that were not, and
perhaps would not have been, included in a study.
There are at least five (non-exclusive) solutions to the problem of extrapolation.
One, simple induction might be used. This is a strategy that some medical
researchers, including Iain Chalmers and Mark Petticrew, seem to advocate [36].
But the examples above suffice to reject this as a robust strategy. Moreover, even the
most vociferous proponents of simple induction would not hold, for example, that
the effects of drugs in plants or animals always apply to humans. Even simple
induction (in practice) must be justified by similarity between study and target
populations. But judgments about relevant similarities come from elsewhere, such
as arguments that relevant causal mechanisms are shared.
Two, n-of-1 trials [37], in which a single patient randomly receives the
experimental treatment or the control for alternating time periods, could be used.
The problem of extrapolation does not arise in the context of n-of-1 trials, because
the the trial population is (usually) the target population. However, n-of-1 trials are
not applicable outside relatively stable chronic ailments.
Three, pragmatic randomized trials that, insofar as possible, mimic target
conditions and have few (if any) exclusion criteria [38], could be considered.
However, pragmatic trials do not solve the problem that average results are not always
good predictors of individual or sub-group responses. Moreover, no matter how
inclusive researchers attempt to make a study, there are likely to be unrepresented
populations and circumstances, especially if one considers that circumstances and
people change over time.
Four, it is arguable that clinical expertise can be used to determine whether trial
results are applicable to target populations or individuals within clinical practice.
While expertise may always be required to take variations in patients’ values and
circumstances and enhancing placebo effects into account [39], it is unclear how
expertise alone (without implicit or explicit appeal to empirical studies) is a
source of evidence for whether an intervention is likely to produce a putative
effect in a study or target population [40].
Five—and this is the potential solution that we shall examine in this paper—it
can be argued that mechanistic knowledge can solve the problem of extrapolation.
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Mechanisms, mechanistic reasoning, and black boxes
To understand how knowledge of mechanisms might solve the problem of
extrapolation, we must explain mechanisms, mechanistic reasoning, and evidence
from controlled clinical studies.
Philosophers have characterized ‘mechanisms’ in many ways, including the
following:
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component
parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated function-
ing of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena. [5, p. 423]
A mechanism underlying a behavior is a complex system which produces that
behavior by the interaction of a number of parts according to direct causal
laws. [2, p. 52]
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination
conditions. [1, p. 3]
A nomological machine is a stable enough arrangement of components whose
features acting in consort give rise to (relatively) stable input/output relations.
[41, p. 8]1
There are others besides [42].
It is beyond our scope to discuss the differences between these characterizations
or their similarities [12, 43], and we contend that our argument applies no matter
which of the above characterizations one prefers. Our interest here is epistemo-
logical: how can knowledge of mechanisms help us predict whether study results
can be successfully implemented? Such alleged knowledge must rest on claims
about a mechanism’s action. Whether the mechanism’s action is called ‘orchestrated
functioning responsible for one or more phenomena’ (William Bechtel and Adele
Abrahamsen) [5], ‘behavior production’ (Stuart Glennan) [44], ‘regular change
production’ (Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, Carl Craver) [1], or ‘action’
(Cartwright) [45] is immaterial to our purpose. Regardless of how they are
characterized, mechanisms must have some action if they are to be used to support
claims that an intervention produces some effect. Following previous work, we
define ‘mechanistic reasoning’ as an inference about an intervention’s clinical effect
from alleged knowledge of relevant mechanisms and how they relate to one another
[46, 47]. By contrast, a controlled trial is a ‘black box’ as far as the inner workings
of an intervention are concerned (see Fig. 1, left-hand side).
Typically, in clinical medicine, more than one mechanism is involved in
producing a patient-relevant effect (see Fig. 1, middle). Consider the example of
mechanistic reasoning that was used to support claims that antiarrhythmic drugs
reduce mortality in certain patients. Several mechanisms (swallowing, gastric
emptying, metabolism, circulatory, and binding mechanisms) might be involved in
1 Cartwright (personal communication) claims that her ‘nomological machines’ fall into the general
category of ‘mechanisms’ as described by the other authors cited above.
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getting the drug to its pharmacological targets. These mechanisms are often well
understood and are referred to as ADME (mechanisms for absorption, distribution,
metabolism, and excretion). Having reached their cellular targets, antiarrhythmic
drugs were believed to reduce the frequency of ventricular extra beats by modifying
the heart’s electrochemical mechanism. Finally, a reduction in ventricular extra
beats should (allegedly) reduce the risk of sudden death, presumably by modifying
the circulatory mechanism (by reducing the risks associated with insufficient blood
flow to vital organs).
It is generally possible to describe the mechanistic chain or web at different
levels. In the antiarrhythmic drug example, we might have categorized the
component mechanisms (ADME, actions on the heart, etc.) as parts (or entities or
components) of a larger mechanism (the human body). Likewise, we might have
chosen the molecular or even subatomic level. We chose to refer to the ADME and
heart mechanisms in the antiarrhythmic drug example because they map most
directly on to the language used by medical researchers.
In any case, the choice of descriptive level [48], or indeed, how one
characterizes mechanisms, does not affect our arguments. The essential feature of
mechanistic reasoning is that it involves an inferential chain (or web) linking the
intervention with a clinically relevant outcome via (productive!) mechanisms. If
the productive capacities of the mechanisms linking the intervention with the
clinical effect can be established, then we have good evidence in the form of what
























Fig. 1 Controlled clinical study and mechanistic reasoning: the example of antiarrhythmic drugs
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How knowledge of mechanisms allegedly solves the problem of extrapolation
Philosophers of science often disagree with evidence-based medicine (EBM)
proponents about the role of mechanisms for supporting claims about efficacy, but
they seem to agree about the role of mechanisms when it comes to extrapolation
[39]. Some influential proponents of EBM have stated, for example, that:
A sound understanding of pathophysiology is necessary to interpret and apply
the results of clinical research. For instance, most patients to whom we would
like to generalize the results of randomized trials would, for one reason or
another, not have been enrolled in the most relevant study. The patient may be
too old, be too sick, have other underlying illnesses, or be uncooperative.
Understanding the underlying pathophysiology allows the clinician to better
judge whether the results are applicable to the patient at hand. [49, p. 2423]
This advice continues in three editions of an EBM textbook [50–52], and critics of
EBM also share this view [53]. To be sure, the term used by some EBM proponents
(‘pathophysiologic rationale’) appears to be different from our ‘mechanistic
reasoning’. At the same time, pathophysiology involves the study of how bodily
processes behave in normal and abnormal circumstances [54], and ‘rationale’ is a
synonym of ‘reasoning’ [54]. Hence, we take ‘pathophysiologic rationale’ to mean
(roughly) the same as ‘mechanistic reasoning’.
By way of support for the EBM view, Gordon Guyatt and Paul Glasziou (in
conversation) have offered the following illustration. A trial might exclude
everyone over the age of 60. They claim that mechanistic considerations support
the view that the intervention is likely to work for a 61 year-old but may not work
for a 90 year-old. Presumably, they take it that the success of the intervention
depends on the operation of pathophysiologic mechanisms that change only slowly
beyond 60 and so would not have changed substantially in most 61 year-olds but
would be highly likely to have changed by the time they are 90.
In a growing body of literature that began with discussions of the applicability of
results from animal studies to humans, philosophers of science have taken what may
be interpreted as a position very similar to that of many EBM proponents. These
philosophers of science have argued that knowledge of mechanisms can justify
implementing average study results to target populations by analogy [9–15]. On this
view, extrapolation is justified insofar as the relevant mechanisms—and hence the
mechanistic reasoning linking the intervention and outcome—are shared in the
study and target populations.
Dan Steel is the philosopher of science who has written most extensively on the
subject and he correctly points out that this simple mechanistic solution to the
problem fails because of the ‘extrapolator’s circle’ [12, 13]. In order to determine
whether the mechanism in the target is sufficiently similar to the mechanism in the
study population to justify extrapolation, one must know how relevant mecha-
nisms in the target behave. But, Steel argues, if one had knowledge of
mechanisms in the target population, then one would have strong mechanistic
reasoning supporting the claim that the intervention caused the outcome in the
target population. This would make the initial study (in the model) redundant. In
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Steel’s words, ‘it needs to be explained how we could know that the model and
the target are similar in causally relevant respects without already knowing the
causal relationship in the target’ [12, p. 78].
To escape from this circle, Steel offers a more sophisticated account of how
mechanistic knowledge might help us justify implementing study results, namely,
comparative process tracing. Comparative process tracing involves two steps:
1. ‘Learn the mechanism in the model organism, by means of process tracing or
other experimental means’ [12, p. 89]. ‘Process tracing’ involves a step-by-step
reconstruction of the path connecting an end-point (an initial cause or a final
effect) with other elements of the mechanism via intermediate nodes.
2. ‘Second, compare stages of the mechanism in the model organism with that of
the target organism in which the two are most likely to differ significantly’ [12,
p. 89].
A key feature of Steel’s account is that one need not know everything about the
mechanisms in the target, but only the relevant parts of the mechanism, namely,
those that are likely to differ significantly. Often, the needed points of comparison
can be limited to stages of the mechanism close to the endpoint—the reasoning
being that differences upstream matter only if they generate differences further
downstream. This significantly reduces the number of points in the mechanism that
need to be compared. Hence, one need not know everything about the mechanism in
the target in advance, and the extrapolator’s circle is allegedly avoided.
In spite of its intuitive appeal, mechanistic reasoning, even in Steel’s more
sophisticated account, is plagued by several problems that make it unsuitable as a
robust solution to the problem of extrapolation.
Problems with mechanistic knowledge for solving the problem of extrapolation
(Epistemological) problems with identifying relevant mechanisms
Mechanistic reasoning will be useful only insofar as relevant mechanisms are
correctly identified and understood. But correct identification of all relevant
mechanisms in any population is far more difficult than is often presumed. For
example, a plausible (but incorrect) mechanism for blood creation led to various
erroneous diagnoses and treatments such as bloodletting. Even if some mechanisms
are correctly identified, other mechanisms (or features of mechanisms) are often
missed. This can lead to mistaken predictions about efficacy, and in the case of
extrapolation, the mistaken claim that mechanistic reasoning in study and target
mechanisms are shared. To see how even apparently sensible mechanisms can lead
to mistaken predictions, recall that mechanistic reasoning supported the view that
anti-arrhythmic drugs would reduce mortality. However, a subsequent randomized
trial suggested that the reasoning was mistaken. In the Cardiac Arrhythmia
Suppression Trial (CAST), 1,827 patients were randomized after myocardial
infarction to receive antiarrhythmic drugs (encainide, flecainide, or moricizine) or
placebo. Ten months later the antiarrhythmic drugs were discontinued because of
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excess mortality: 4.5% of those who took either encainide or flecainide had died of
arrhythmias or cardiac arrest, while only 1.2% of those who took placebo had died
for similar reasons [55]. The experimental drugs also accounted for 4.7% greater all-
cause mortality (see Fig. 1, right hand side). The drugs activated an unsuspected
mechanism that increased mortality.
Even in areas that are very well understood, such as the cholesterol pathway,
drugs can activate unexpected mechanisms, with dramatic consequences [56].
Thalidomide, for example, was introduced to relieve morning sickness but was later
found to cause severe birth defects. Surprising side effects can also be positive.
Sildenafil was originally designed to treat angina, but in the first clinical trials, it
revealed the surprising effect of producing penile erection; it was subsequently
marketed as ViagraTM and became a huge commercial success.
Steel would presumably reject the claim that all relevant mechanisms need to be
identified, because it is often allegedly sufficient to identify downstream stages
(‘bottlenecks’) through which the eventual clinical outcome must be produced.
However, this raises the issue of how researchers know that they have identified the
bottlenecks correctly, and whether they are sure they have not missed some
additional mechanisms activated by the intervention but bypassing the bottleneck.
The antiarrhythmic drug example and many others [57, 58] suggest that our
knowledge of mechanisms is often lacking. Indeed some have argued that medicine
did more harm than good until quite recently, precisely because of reliance on faulty
or incomplete knowledge of mechanisms [59]. Steel fails to acknowledge this
literature and hence leaves us wondering how mechanistic reasoning that is
grounded in sufficient knowledge of mechanisms can be distinguished from
mechanistic reasoning based on incomplete or mistaken alleged knowledge of
mechanisms.
Why studies of mechanisms suffer from problems of generalizability
The functioning of most mechanisms is discovered in tightly controlled
laboratory experiments that expressly exclude as many potentially interfering
variables as possible. Why would effects discovered in tightly controlled
laboratory circumstances generalize more readily than effects discovered in
controlled clinical studies? If they do not, then any knowledge about the
mechanisms gained in these controlled settings is less likely to be shared by
‘real world’ populations. For example, St. John’s wort has been shown in
laboratory settings to induce the activity of cytochrome P450 (CYP) isoenzymes,
which are extensively involved in metabolizing about 50% of known drugs [60],
including many steroids. However, a clinical study suggested St. John’s wort did
not reduce the concentrations of androgenic steroids [61], presumably because of
some compensatory mechanism. In this example the behaviour of a mechanism
in the laboratory was not reproducible in a real clinical setting. Knowledge of
mechanisms gained in these tightly controlled contexts may differ relevantly
from mechanisms in both trial and target populations and therefore cannot
straightforwardly be used to justify claims about similarity between trial and
target populations.
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The unwarranted ontological assumption that mechanisms are productive
of regular relationships between inputs and outputs
Claude Bernard, perhaps the grandfather of contemporary mechanistic reasoning in
medicine, believed that mechanisms were productive of stable deterministic laws
that precluded the need for any further ‘empirical’ evidence (for example, from
controlled studies). He stated for example that:
Now that the cause of the itch is known and experimentally determined, it has
all become scientific, and empiricism has disappeared. We know the tick, and
by it we explain the transmission of the itch, the skin changes and the cure,
which is only the tick’s death through appropriate application of toxic
agents.… We cure it always without any exception, when we place ourselves
in the known experimental conditions for reaching this goal. [62, p. 214]
While few today believe that more than a handful of diseases (if any!) are cured
‘always and without exception’ [63]—and indeed Claude Bernard himself
advocated clinical trials when mechanisms were unknown [64]—the belief that
mechanisms produce stable relationships is widely held among mechanist philos-
ophers of science. Consider other excerpts from the recent literature.
[Mechanisms are] entities and activities organized such that they are
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination
conditions. [1, p. 3 emphasis added]
The existence of a mechanism provides evidence of the stability of a causal
relationship. If we can single out a plausible mechanism, then that mechanism
is likely to occur in a range of individuals, making the causal relation stable
over a variety of populations. [7, p. 159, emphasis added]
Nomological machines [mechanisms] generate causal laws between inputs and
predictable outputs. [65, p. 156, emphasis added]
The belief that mechanisms are productive of stable relationships might be
borrowed from mechanics, where, if the quantum level is ignored, there are many
mechanisms productive of stable input-output relationships. For instance, Cart-
wright cites the example of a toaster’s mechanism [41]. But mechanisms in the
human body and social world, especially those that are pertinent to clinically
relevant outcomes, are generally far more complex than toasters and other
mechanical machines. Besides the epistemological problems with discovering any
assumed regularity (such as extreme sensitivity to initial conditions and complex
interactions), mechanisms themselves might not behave regularly at all [66].
Mechanisms’ irregular behaviour is perhaps best exemplified by paradoxical
reactions. Smith et al. have listed many drugs that sometimes worsen the condition
for which they are indicated [67]. To name a few, antiepileptic drugs can both
prevent and cause seizures [68, 69], antidepressants can both ameliorate and worsen
depressive symptoms [70, 71], and antiarrhythmic drugs can cause arrhythmias [72].
Even the same molecule can initiate different mechanisms depending on its
environment within the body.
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If mechanisms can have paradoxical and unanticipated effects, then even if it is
established that some mechanisms in the study and target populations are shared,
one cannot know whether they will behave the same way in different populations. A
supporter of mechanistic reasoning might, of course, claim that the paradoxical
behaviour of the mechanism is simply a sign that some other mechanism (or feature
of the mechanism) that can explain the paradox is yet to be identified. But this
objection seems to rely on a determinist metaphysics that requires independent
arguments.
To recap, mechanistic reasoning as a strategy for solving the problem of
extrapolation faces several hitherto unmet challenges. We will now argue in more
detail that neither Steel’s comparative process tracing nor Cartwright’s account
overcomes the problems we have pointed out above.
How Daniel Steel’s comparative process tracing does not avoid
the extrapolator’s circle
Recall Steel’s argument that comparative process tracing is a mechanist solution to
the problem of extrapolation that does not fall into the extrapolator’s circle.
Comparative process tracing relies on ‘[j]udgments about where significant
differences are and are not likely to occur … based on inductive inferences
concerning known similarities in related mechanisms in a class of organisms, and on
the impact those differences make’ [12, p. 89]. In short, Steel divides parts of the
mechanisms (in both the model and target) into two categories: those that are known
(or suspected) to be similar, and those for which significant differences are likely.
Consider the single example (the carcinogenic effects of the aflatoxin AFB1) that
Steel offers in support of his thesis:
It was found that AFB1, the most common aflatoxin, was converted to the
same phase I metabolite across [human and rodent] groups…. Given the sharp
differences in carcinogenic effects of AFB1 in rats and mice, it was of obvious
interest to inquire which of these two animal models was a better guide for
humans. It was found that although the phase I metabolism of AFB1 proceeded
similarly among mice, rats, and humans (and in fact at a higher rate in mice),
the phase II metabolism among mice was extremely effective in detoxifying
AFB1 but not among rats or humans…. Furthermore, this metabolite bound to
DNA in rat liver cells in vivo at sites at which the nucleotide base guanine was
present to form complexes called DNA adducts…. It was further found that
such cells suffered unusually frequent mutations in which guanine-cytosine
base pairs were replaced with adenine-thymine pairs, a mutagenic effect found
in vivo among rats and in vitro among cells of a variety of origins, including
bacteria and human [cells]…. In addition, guanine-cytosine to adenine-
thymine mutations were found in activated oncogenes present in rats exposed
to AFB1 but were absent in the controls…. Thus, comparative process tracing
yielded the conclusion that the rat was a better model than the mouse.
[12, p. 91]
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This example—and comparative tracing in general—does not support the view that
comparative process tracing escapes the extrapolator’s circle. First, consider the
parts of the mechanism that are allegedly known to be similar (phase I metabolism
in the aflatoxin example). In order to establish that phase I metabolism was similar
across groups, Steel cites a study involving humans as well as rodents [73]. But once
the study in humans is available, the rodent study becomes redundant and Steel
faces the extrapolator’s circle.
This leaves the parts of the mechanism that are suspected to differ between the
target and model. In Steel’s example, the phase II similarity between rats and
humans (and the difference between mice and humans) was likely to differ but the
similarity was allegedly established by a study in humans. This makes the study in
rats redundant. Moreover, the study Steel cites in support of the view that rats are
better models than mice [74] does not involve clinical outcomes, but merely in vitro
studies of human blood samples.
In short, for both categories of comparisons (those in which model and target
mechanisms are likely to be similar and those in which model and target
mechanisms are likely to be different), the study of the model is redundant and
comparative process tracing does not escape the extrapolator’s circle.
Steel’s claim that all similarities and differences need not be known provided that
‘bottlenecks through which any influence on the outcome must be transmitted’ can
be found [12, p. 90] does not save his argument. Besides the problem of correctly
identifying bottlenecks (see above), this potential reply slips back into the
extrapolator’s circle: if one knows where the bottlenecks are in the target, then
the knowledge of the mechanism in the study population (at least upstream from the
bottleneck) becomes redundant. As for the mechanisms downstream from a
bottleneck, either they are known to be similar or known to be different. In each
case, studies of the target are required to establish the similarity or difference and
the extrapolator’s circle re-emerges.
Cartwright’s example fails to support the view that mechanisms can solve
the problem of extrapolation
With the common problems with mechanistic reasoning in mind, we now revisit
Cartwright’s TINP example to show why it does not support using mechanistic
reasoning to solve the problem of extrapolation. The ‘man shopper’ and ‘mother-in-
law’ factors in the BINP study upset the mechanism that was effective in the TINP
study by preventing delivery of the food to the children’s stomachs. This post-hoc
explanation might have informed policy makers how to modify BINP and prevented
its failure. However, knowledge of the different mechanisms might have produced
harm. Imagine that the World Bank hired consultants who correctly identified the
problems. The consultants might reasonably propose to deliver the food directly to
the mother, and not allow the men or mothers-in-law to lay their hands on it (or
alternatively ‘educate’ the mothers-in-law and men). But such a plan could easily
backfire: the mothers-in-law and fathers could feel resentful and become abusive
towards mothers and children. In this imaginary—but sadly by no means
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implausible—example, appeal to mechanisms when extrapolated would lead to
harm. The cause of the failure would have been the inability to identify all relevant
mechanisms activated by the modified intervention. Ironically, if all relevant
mechanisms had been identified, then investigators would have fallen into the
extrapolator’s circle!
To recap, mechanistic reasoning provides prima facie promise for solving the
problem of extrapolation, but several obstacles stand in the way of its providing an
actual solution. First, it is rarely possible to identify all relevant mechanisms.
Second, studies of mechanisms themselves (whether in animals or humans) suffer
from their own problems of ‘external validity’. Third, mechanisms can behave
paradoxically. Steel’s comparative process tracing fails to solve the problem, and
contrary to what Cartwright asserts, appealing to knowledge of mechanisms to solve
the problem of extrapolation can harm rather than help. At the same time, there are
some well-defined cases in which mechanistic knowledge can provide a reliable
solution to the problem of extrapolation.
When mechanistic knowledge can help justify applying average study
results to target populations
The limits to our knowledge of mechanisms listed above must temper our
confidence in all mechanistic reasoning, whether it is used to establish efficacy [46,
47] or to solve the problem of extrapolation. However, some claims about
mechanisms are based on stronger evidence than others [46], and in these cases
mechanistic reasoning can be used to justify extrapolation. For example, the
proximate causes of stroke have been known for centuries [75, 76]. A burst artery in
the brain causes a haemorrhagic stroke, while an ischemic stroke is caused by a
blockage of an artery that supplies blood to the brain, by either thrombosis or
embolism. Aspirin benefits patients who have had an ischemic stroke, but may harm
those who have had a haemorrhagic stroke. The cause of the stroke (identification of
the mechanism that has been disturbed) can be discovered by a CT scan. In this
case, extrapolation of studies (of the treatments for ischemic or haemorrhagic
stroke) to individual patients uses mechanistic reasoning to classify patients into
groups that are likely to benefit or not from an intervention.
To cite another example of how understanding mechanisms can reduce
harmful extrapolation, recall from earlier that the drug benoxaprofen (OraflexTM
in the USA and OprenTM in Europe) proved effective in clinical trials, but killed
some elderly patients when it was used in routine practice [77]. This was due to
altered pharmacokinetics in the elderly patients, which should have been
suspected, based on what is known about the physiology and pathology of
ageing; frail elderly subjects have reduced liver function and benoxaprofen is
metabolized in the liver. There are other well-known examples of effect
modification by age, including antihypertensive drug treatments, which reduce
total mortality in middle-aged patients but may not do so in elderly ones [78],
and reducing dosages of growth hormone for adults with growth hormone
deficiency [79, 80].
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Conclusion
The problem of extrapolation is real, and simple induction fails in many important
cases. In this paper we have evaluated mechanistic knowledge as a potential
solution to the problem and concluded it is rarely successful. We have illustrated
four often overlooked problems with using mechanistic knowledge for solving the
problem of applicability: current knowledge of mechanisms is often mistaken, the
mechanistic knowledge itself can lack external validity, mechanisms can behave
paradoxically, and the mechanist solution does not overcome the problem of the
extrapolator’s circle. Where these problems have been addressed, knowledge of
mechanisms can mitigate the problem of extrapolation, often by sounding a bell of
caution when implementing study results to target populations whose mechanisms
are known to differ significantly.
When mechanistic understanding is lacking, how might extrapolation of study
results to target populations be justified? Certainly more systematic investigations of
the various potential solutions described in this paper (pragmatic trials, n-of-1 trials,
and clinical expertise) are warranted. Or, an intervention that shows promise in a trial
could be rolled out to target populations slowly, and modified according to what is
systematically observed. A possibility that has been implied throughout this paper is
that we have to learn to live with a much higher degree of uncertainty and scepticism
about the effects of many medical interventions, even those whose effects have been
established in well-controlled population studies.
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